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Removal of Voting Power From Members of
Non-Profit Organizations
Timothy L. Nesbitt*
Q UESTIONS OF VOTING POWER in corporations have been litigated many
times.' The right to vote in corporate matters has been declared
to be a property right.2 In business corporations the right to vote shares
of stock having voting powers ordinarily is viewed as an incident of legal
ownership,3 and to deprive a stockholder of the right to vote is to de-
prive him of an essential attribute of his property.4 A New York court
stated, in Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,5 that "The right to
vote for directors therefore, is the right to protect property from loss...
In other words, it is the right which gives the property value and is part
of the property itself, for it cannot be separated therefrom." An Ohio
court long ago stated that "The right to vote is an incident of ownership
of stock, and can not exist apart from it." 6
Statute provisions as to voting in non-profit organizations are inade-
quate both in coverage and precision. There appears to be some diver-
gence of views among the various courts as to the existence of a property
right in voting aspects of non-profit organizations. Since the right to
earn a living has been deemed to be property within the concept of the
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, a fortiori membership in
a trade union, in the service of its interest, is a property right which the
courts will protect.7 The National Labor Relations Act recognizes that
* B.B-A., Western Reserve University; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 See, 3 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, ch. 57, 58 (1959, with 1965 suppl.), as to
statute provisions and voting control methods.
2 Shinkle v. Dalton Adding Machine Co., 19 Ohio N.P. (NS) 104, 26 Ohio Dec. N.P.
588 (1916); Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443 (1909).
3 Drob v. National Memorial Park, Inc., 28 Del. Ch. 254, 41 A.2d 589 (1945); In re
Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21 A.2d 697 (1941); McLain v. Lanova
Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 176, 39 A.2d 209 (1944); Tracy v. Brentwood Village Corp., 30 Del.
Ch. 296, 59 A.2d 708 (1948); Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N.E. 496 (1890);
Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra n. 2; Johnson v. Heap, 1 Wash.2d
316, 95 P.2d 1039 (1939); Reimer v. Smith, 105 Fla. 671, 142 So. 603 (1932).
4 Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra n. 2; Stokes v. Continental Trust
Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906); Kinnan v. Sullivan Country Club, 26 N.Y. 213,
50 N.Y.S. 95 (1898).
5 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443, 448 (1909).
6 Griffith v. Jewett, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 627, 632, 15 Cinc. L. Bul. 419 (1886).
7 See, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations and Assns., 279, 280 (2d ed.
1965); DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139, 187 P.2d 769,
175 A.L.R. 382, cert. den. 333 U.S. 876 (1947), citing, Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 N.J.
Eq. 593, 177 A. 102 (1935); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, aff'd. 31 N.Y.S.2d 849
(1941) and Cameron v. International Alliance, 118 N.J.Eq. 11, 176 A. 692, 697, 700, 97
A.L.R. 594 (1935).
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rights of members of unions are economic in nature, so as to constitute
property rights." It has been held that a member of a voluntary associa-
tion, not a charity, has a property right in its assetsY A recent Ohio case
even said that, "Inherent in memberships in churches, or any other non-
profit incorporated or unincorporated organizations and societies, is the
right to a share of the organization's properties ... a property right does
exist." 10 Yet, a member of a club organized as a corporation not for
profit, whose membership is terminated, has no right or interest in the
property of the corporation except such as is given him by the articles
and regulations of the corporation.1 In situations where life member-
ships are used, the member is a part owner of the property of the organi-
zation only during his lifetime.' 2
Some courts refuse to accept the property right theory. An Indiana
court approached the right to vote in an election for officers of a volun-
tary association as a right stemming from membership, but treated it as
a privilege extended by the organization's constitution to members in
good standing. 13 The court proceeded to say, "Membership in an unin-
corporated association ... is a privilege and is neither a civil nor prop-
erty right." 14 A like conclusion was reached by a New York court in
response to a petition to set aside the election of directors of the New
York State Council Knights of Columbus. 15 The court said that a mem-
ber of a charitable corporation does not have a vested right to vote for its
directors or trustees, as he has no interest in the property of the corpora-
tion.'6 The same conclusion was reached in an earlier New York decision
which held that members of a charitable corporation, a hospital, did not
have a vested right to vote for trustees, and that such right was not con-
stitutionally protected.17
In an attempt to resolve the problem, some courts have developed
a contract theory which is used as a substitute for finding a property
8 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Supp., sec. 101 amending sections 8a
(3), (5), and 9 (3).
9 Bacon v. Paradise, 318 Mass. 649, 63 N.E.2d 571 (1945), citing, Balukonis v. Lithu-
anian Roman Catholic Benefit Society, 272 Mass. 366, 172 N.E. 505 (1930); Hamaty v.
St. George Ladies Society, 280 Mass. 58, 181 N.E. 775 (1932).
10 Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 100, 120 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1954).
11 Chestnut Beach Association v. May, 44 Ohio App. 217, 184 N.E. 856 (1933); De-
Bruyn v. Golden Age Club of Cheyenne, 399 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1965).
12 Flaherty v. Manufacturers' Club of Philadelphia, 104 Pa. Super 546, 159 A. 209
(1932).
13 State ex rel Givens v. Superior Court of Marion County, 233 Ind. 235, 117 N.E.2d
553 (1954).
14 Ibid., 117 N.E.2d at 555, citing, 7 C.J.S., Associations, sec. 23, p. 56.
15 Petition of Sousa, 203 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sup. Ct., 1960). Also see McClintock, Equity
434 (2d ed. 1948).
16 Ibid., 203 N.Y.S. 2d at 5.
17 In re Mt. Sinai Hospital, 250 N.Y. 103, 164 N.E. 871 (1928); see also Westlake Hos-
pital Association v. Blix, 13 Ill.2d 183, 148 N.E.2d 471, app. disrn. 358 U.S. 43, 79 S. Ct.
44, 3 L. Ed.2d 43 (1958).
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right. An early Massachusetts case held that "The by-laws constituted
in effect a contract between the different members and the corpora-
tion." 18 This view also is followed in Alabama,19 Illinois,20 Kansas,21
Louisiana, 22 Minnesota, 23 New York,2 4 Ohio,25 and Oklahoma.26 (Haring-
ton v. Sendall, 1 Ch. 921, a 1903 decision, apparently maintains this same
rule for England.) Members are presumed to be acquainted with the
constitution, by-laws, and regulations.2 7 One court pointed out that, "In
churches, lodges, and all other like voluntary associations each person,
on becoming a member, either by express stipulation or by implication,
agrees to abide by all rules and regulations adopted by the organiza-
tion ... .,, 28 A voluntary association may adopt by-laws and rules which
will be controlling as to all questions of doctrine or internal policy, 2 ) pro-
vided such by-laws and rules are not immoral, unreasonable, contrary to
public policy, nor in contravention of the law of the land.30 The by-laws
reflect a member's rights in the organization. In light of this an appeal
to a constitutional bill of rights (which is designed to protect the citi-
zen against oppression by the government) is usually unsuccessful.3 '
Since the constitution and by-laws of a voluntary association are of no
18 Boston Club v. Potter, 212 Mass. 23, 98 N.E. 614, 615 (1912), citing, Flint v. Pierce,
99 Mass. 68, 70, 96 Am. Dec. 691 (1868); Dolan v. Court Good Samaritan, 128 Mass.
437 (1880).
19 Waugaman v. Skyline Country Club, 277 Ala. 495, 172 So.2d 381 (1965).
20 Bostedo v. Board of Trade, 227 Ill. 90, 81 N.E. 42 (1907); Werner v. International
Association of Machinists, 11 Ill. App.2d 258, 137 N.E.2d 100 (1956), cert. denied;
O'Brien v. Matual, 14 Ill. App.2d 173, 144 N.E.2d 446 (1957). The latter two cases
both involve disputes in labor unions and point out how the rule in the leading case
is applied.
21 Lake of the Forest Club v. Buttles, 142 Kan. 538, 51 P.2d 18 (1935).
22 Colonial Country Club v. Richmond, 19 La. App. 272, 140 So. 86, 87 (1932), citing
the rule in 11 C.J. 924; Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Association No. 12, 179
La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934), citing 5 C.J. "Associations," Sec. 72, p. 1355.
23 Anderson v. Amidon, 114 Minn. 202, 130 N.W. 1002 (1911); Rensch v. General Driv-
ers, Helpers, and Truck Terminal Emp. Local 120, 268 Minn. 307, 129 N.W.2d 341
(1964), illustrating the result of a breach of the contract on the part of the union.
24 People v. New York Motor Boat Club, 70 Misc. 603, 129 N.Y.S. 365 (1911), showing
that a member following the method prescribed in the by-laws for resignation was
acting in accordance with the contract.
25 Leahigh v. Beyer, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 69, 116 N.E.2d 458 (1953), which holds that hav-
ing established the contractual basis for membership in unions, internal remedies
within the by-laws must be exhausted before resorting to the courts, and a by-law
denying the right to appeal is not unconstitutional.
26 Oklahoma Association of Insurance Agents v. Hudson, 385 P.2d 453 (Okla. 1963).
27 Colonial Country Club v. Richmond, supra n. 22.
28 Langer v. North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 23 F.
Supp. 694, 699 (D.C. Ill. 1936), affd., 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938).
29 Bostedo v. Board of Trade, supra n. 20; Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App.2d 514, 123
N.E.2d 104 (1954); Campbell v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 4 Ohio App.2d
81, 212 N.E.2d 650 (1965).
80 Greene v. Board of Trade, 174 111. 585, 51 N.E. 599 (1898).
31 In re Mt. Sinai Hospital, supra n. 17; Westlake Hospital Association v. Blix, supra
n. 17.
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legal validity and effect except as contracts among members, they are
binding only on members who are shown to have assented to them.
32
Dissatisfied members of non-profit organizations generally appeal to
courts of equity. But the office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, un-
less enlarged by express statute, sometimes are said to be limited to the
protection of rights of property.33 As stated by an Ohio court ". . . courts
of equity have no authority to interfere with the action of voluntary and
unincorporated associations where no property right is involved." 34 Yet,
the term "property right" is understood to include contract rights, and
any civil right of a pecuniary nature, whether technically "property" or
not.35 In many cases, the slightest color of, or circumstances tending to
suggest, a so-called "property right," is grounds for jurisdiction. This
tendency indicates that the principle supposedly limiting the jurisdiction
of equity to the protection and enforcement of property and contract
rights lacks substantial basis. Some courts have said that equity will
protect purely personal rights. 36 A federal court has clearly stated that:
The doctrine that equity jurisdiction is limited to the protection
of property rights conflicts with the familiar principle that equity
may give preventive relief when the legal remedy of money dam-
ages, if available at all, is inadequate to redress a wrong. Obviously
money has little in common with such personal rights or interests as
reputation, domestic relations, or membership in non-profit organi-
zations.37
It then goes on to say that injunctions are much better suited to pro-
tect interests of personalty than a speculative action for damages.38 Ohio
courts are in accord with the federal view, and have recognized that in
a great number of cases the courts have issued injunctions to protect
purely personal rights.3 9
32 Leahigh v. Beyer, supra n. 25, obiter dictum.
33 State ex rel Moyer v. Baldwin, 77 Ohio St. 532, 546, 83 N.E. 907 (1908); Riggs v.
Cincinnati Waiters Alliance Local, 5 Ohio N.P. 386, 8 Ohio Dec. N.P. 565 (1898). See
Oleck, Maxims of Equity Re-Appraised, 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 528 (1952).
34 State ex rel Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Judges of the Court of Common
Pleas of Stark County, 173 Ohio St. 329, 181 N.E.2d 261 (1962), quoting from 5 Ohio
Jur. 2d 440, sec. 7 and Boblitt v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry.
Co., 73 Ohio App. 339, 56 N.E.2d 348 (1943).
35 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236, 63 L. Ed. 211
(1918).
36 Randolph v. First Baptist Church, supra n. 10, 489 ff. has an excellent treatment
of this point; Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S.E. 861 (1919), in this case the court
granted a prohibitive injunction against a man who had induced a minor girl to
abandon her parental home and live with him; also see 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Associations,
sec. 40.
37 Berrien v. Pollitzer, 83 U.S. App. D.C. 23, 165 F.2d 21, 22 (1947) referring to
Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts? 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1, 27, 35 (1926-7).
38 Ibid., quoting from Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 933, 938 (1929-30).
39 Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924). See dissenting opinion of
Marshall, CJ., at 245, for this analysis.
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Judicial interference in the internal affairs of a voluntary associa-
tion is justified where there is a violation of contract obligations or an
invasion of property rights. 40 Thus, courts will not hesitate to entertain
jurisdiction and afford relief where property rights41 or purely personal
rights42 are involved.
In American Aberdeen-Angus Breeders' Association v. Fullerton the
court held that a non-profit corporation may make any reasonable regu-
lation (i.e., limiting voting rights) for election of directors by members
or convention where no conflict with a state statute is present. 43 The
same court in a later case reasoned that the State, through the legisla-
ture, retains the right to amend the statute, and the organization, pur-
suant to the statute, reserves the power to amend the by-laws. It thus
would follow that the right of members of a charitable corporation to
vote is not constitutionally protected.44 This rationale was followed by
New York in a case where the state legislature passed a statute amend-
ing the charter of a charitable corporation so as to provide for the elec-
tion of trustees by trustees whose terms have not expired instead of by
the members of the organization. 45 The court stated that the right of
members of a charitable corporation to vote for trustees is not a vested
interest entitled to protection under the Constitution. It further held
that there was no denial of due process of law by making the board of
trustees self-perpetuating and transferring the right to vote from the
members to the board itself. Prior to the Mt. Sinai decision the court
had enlarged its holding to include membership in non-profit corpora-
tions by finding that by-law provisions creating a self-perpetuating board
of managers do not infringe on any property or other enforceable right
of members. 46
In the absence of rules to the contrary, an association acting through
its members may elect such officers as it chooses. 47 Regulation of the
election is by the articles of the association or the constitution and by-
laws of the organization, or, if none exist, by the usage of the association
and regulations adopted by it.48 An Indiana court held that "The major-
40 Green v. Obergfell, 73 U.S. App. D.C. 298, 121 F.2d. 46, 138 A.L.R. 258, cert. den.
314 U.S. 637 (1941); Werner v. International Association of Machinists, supra n. 19.
41 Supra n. 33.
42 Supra n. 36.
43 American Aberdeen-Angus Breeders' Association v. Fullerton, 325 Ill. 323, 329,
330, 156 N.E. 314 (1927); Mackey v. Moss, 278 Ala. 713, 175 So.2d 749 (1965).
44 Westlake Hospital Association v. Blix, supra n. 17.
45 In re Mt. Sinai Hospital, supra n. 17.
46 Bailey v. American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 282 App. Div.
502, 125 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1953) aff'd. 307 N.Y. 679; Petition of Sousa, supra n. 15; Leahigh
v. Beyer, supra n. 25.
47 Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N.Y. 353, 55 N.E. 919 (1900).
48 Grand Rapids Guard v. Bulkley, 97 Mich. 610, 57 N.W. 188 (1893); Strempel v.
Rubing, 4 N.Y.S. 534 (1889); In re Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n. of Delaware, 41 Del.
Ch. 369, 195 A.2d 759 (1963).
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ity rule is final unless it violates property rights or liberties protected
under the constitution and laws of the state." 49 Elections must be held
in accordance with the by-laws and constitution of the society. 50 If the
action by a member is concerned solely with the question of proper title
to an office in a club or other non-profit organization, a court of equity
has no jurisdiction, the remedy of quo warranto being available.51
It may thus be seen that the court will not interfere with the inter-
nal affairs of a religious organization when no property rights are in-
volved.5 2 It has been pointed out that courts will accept as conclusive
the decision of an association tribunal except in cases involving a prop-
erty right.53 Lacking a method for redress of grievances, a member of
a non-profit organization may turn to the court of equity to enjoin any
unlawful act by the organization towards one of its members.54 Minority
stockholders in business corporations may bring an action when the di-
rectors and majority have breached their fiduciary duties to the minor-
ity.55
The Ethical Practices Code of the AFL-CIO states that:
1. Each member of a union should have the right to full and free
participation in union self-government. This should include the
right (a) to vote periodically for his local and national officers,
either directly by referendum vote or through delegate bodies, (b)
to honest elections, (c) to stand for and to hold office, subject only
to fair qualification uniformly imposed, (d) to voice his views as to
the method in which the union's affairs should be conducted. 5
It is evident that the right to vote in non-profit organizations has
been judicially recognized but has received uneven protection.57 As a
general rule, unless the right to vote is specifically restricted, every mem-
ber of a non-profit organization is entitled to vote. The right to vote may
be defined in the provisions by which the organization is governed, and
in that case the right to vote is restricted to those within the terms of the
49 Standsberry v. McCarty, 238 Ind. 338, 149 N.E.2d 683, 686 (1958); State ex rel
Givens, supra n. 13; 45 Am. Jur., Religious Societies, sec. 61.
50 Long v. Harvey, 177 Pa. 473, 35 A. 869 (1896).
51 Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 555, 146 S.E. 173 (1928). This rule was questioned
in Cummings v. Robinson, 194 Ga. 336, 21 S.E.2d 627, 634 (1942) which points out that
the decision that quo warranto was the more "speedy remedy," was not concurred
in by all the justices and is not binding as precedent.
52 Gibson v. Singleton, 149 Ga. 502, 101 S.E. 178 (1919).
53 Note, Protection of Membership in Voluntary Associations, 37 Yale L. J. 368 (1927-
28), citing State ex rel Buckner v. Landwehr, 261 S.W. 699 (Mo. App. 1924) and
others. Howard v. Betts, 190 Ga. 530, 9 S.E.2d 742 (1940) citing 5 C.J. 1357.
54 Engel v. Walsh, 258 Ill. 98, 101 N.E. 222 (1913), rehearing denied. This was a case
in which the court held the labor union was acting lawfully and properly within its
own rules in fining a member.
55 Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355 (1965).
56 Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 Yale L.J. 1221, 1236 (1961),
n. 87, citing the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Code on Union Democratic Processes.
57 Ibid., 1230 ff.
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governing provision.5" Illinois courts, for example, have held that an
organization not for profit may adopt a constitution or by-laws by which
the members can be deprived of the right to vote for the election of
trustees.59 As long as even one court will rule that the voting power is
a basic contractual right which cannot be taken away without consent,
some member will protest the deprivation or dilution of his voting power.
State statutes regulating voting rights of non-profit organizations
offer little help in assuring the right to vote. Most statutes permit arti-
cles or by-laws of the organization to limit or eliminate the members'
voting rights.60 The Model Non-Profit Corporations Act, showing the
heavy influence of general business corporation law, distinctly fails to
protect the individual member.61 The proposed Non-Profit Organization
Act suggested by Professor Oleck in his book, Non-Profit Corporations,
Organizations and Associations, 62 contains the provision that "directors
other than those named in the certificate of incorporation shall be elected
by the members and other persons entitled to vote." 63 His proposed pro-
vision views the members, not the directors or trustees, as the basic re-
positories of voting power. This view is consistent with the true nature
of voluntary associations not for profit, and is the best way to protect
members' rights.
58 Randolph v. Mt. Zion Baptist Church of Newark, 139 N.J. Eq. 605, 53 A.2d 206
(1947).
59 People ex rel Hoyne v. Grant, 283 Ill. 391, 119 N.E. 344 (1918).
60 Illinois: "The right of the members, or any class or classes of members, to vote
may be limited, enlarged or denied to the extent specified in the articles of incorpo-
ration or the by-laws." Ill. Stats. 32, sec. 163a 14.
Ohio: "Except as otherwise provided in the articles or the regulations, each mem-
ber, regardless of class, shall be entitled to one vote on each matter properly sub-
mitted to the members for their vote . .. ." Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 1702.20.
California: "The authorized number and qualifications of members of the corpo-
ration, the different classes of membership, if any, the property, voting, and other
rights and privileges of members . . . shall be set forth either in the articles or in
the by-laws, . . ." 25 Cal. Code, sec. 9301.
61 ALI-ABA Model Non-Profit Corporations Act, sec. 15, Voting (1964 revision).
62 Prentice-Hall, 2d ed., 1965.
63 Id. at 575, 583: Proposed Non-Profit Organizations Act, Article XVI, sec. 52.
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